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1. Studying Political Communication in Turbulent Times 
 
We live in times of rapid political and social change that are highly complex 
and unpredictable. The 2008 crisis of the capitalist economy constituted a 
societal watershed. Rebellions, uprisings, occupations, revolutions, and 
counter-revolutions have become more frequent in the years since the crisis. 
Austerity measures, as well as short-sighted, uncoordinated responses to the 
the plight of refugees and to wars, have resulted in crises of national and 
transnational state power. In respect to ideologies and worldviews, socialism, 
nationalism and right-wing radicalism have been strengthened. New 
technologies and popular culture have been embedded into these changes. 
 
Paolo Gerbaudo’s (2017) book The Mask and the Flag: Populism, Citizenism 
and Global Protest, whose approach is reflected in his Crosscurrents piece in 
the issue of Media, Culture & Society at hand, is a response to these societal, 
political and academic challenges. Paolo suggests that the term populism 
should not simply be seen as signifying characteristics of right-wing radical 
movements, but should rather be understood in terms of people-power, 
grassroots empowerment, self-government, participatory democracy, and the 
common interest that aims at benefiting all those opposed to a particularism 
that benefits the few, the rich and the powerful at the expense of the many. 
He argues that left-wing populism is a long-standing tradition, a tradition that 
has resurfaced in new forms in recent progressive social movements.  
 
Certainly, as Paolo Gerbaudo concludes in his contribution to this 
Crosscurrents section, the “future will tell if this populist potential of social 
media will only favour rightwing populists as Donald Trump and Nigel Farage 
that are currently taking the lead in defining this trend, or whether a more 
progressive and hopeful form of populism, such as the one championed by 
the likes of Podemos and Bernie Sanders will prevail”. But history is not pure 
chance, but chance with necessity that can be influenced to a degree so that 
certain options for future developments become more likely and others less 
so. It is in this context that in my recent work I have become interested in a 
specific set of negative-dialectical questions that address another way of how 
critical research can inform left-wing movements. I ask: Why is it that right-
wing authoritarian populism in recent times has become much more popular 
than left-wing movements? How do right-wing authoritarian movements 
communicate? Why is it that right-wing political communication strategies 
seem to garner and result in mass support? Engaging with these questions 
has convinced me that authoritarianism and authoritarian capitalism, rather 
than populism, are key critical theory categories for understanding, explaining 
and intervening into the political conjuncture that we are currently 
experiencing.  
 
2. Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
 
The far-right is successful in using social media for political communication. 
The far-right’s use of the Internet has been much less studied than 
progressive movements’ communication. W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra 
Segerberg’s book The Logic of Connective Action (2013) mentions Occupy 70 
times. It does not mention the Golden Dawn, Jobbik, the National Front, UKIP, 
Svoboda, Nigel Farage, the FPÖ, the Sweden Democrats, the Finns Party, 
Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, etc. a single time. The Encyclopedia of Social 
Movement Media (Downing 2011) presents 600 pages of analyses of 
“alternative media, citizens’ media, community media, counterinformation 
media, grassroots media, independent media, nano-media, participatory 
media, social movement media, and underground media” (xxv). The focus is 
on all sorts of progressive, left-wing media, from the likes of the Adbusters 
Media Foundation to Zapatista media. The editor John Downing admits that 
“much less examination of media of extreme right movements occurs in this 
volume than there might be” (xxvi), but he does not explain why this might be 
the case, why it is problematic, and how it could be changed. 
 
My argument is that we should not just study what we like, but also what we 
really dislike. Critical research is not a Facebook or Twitter ‘like’ button, but 
must try to impart insights that can inform changes in the world. This does not 
simply require construction and positivism, but also the analysis of negative 
dialectics that hinder, and at the same time require, determinate negations, 
positive negations of the negative.  
 
Contrary to the other contributions to this Crosscurrents section, I do not find 
the concept of populism theoretically meaningful. Its uses are too confused, 
meaning that the term requires constant explanation when employed in 
academic research. In the broadest sense, populism is the movement of 
making something popular, such as in popular culture. Etymologically the term 
“popular” stems from the Latin word popularis that designates that something 
is prevalent in the public (Williams 1983, 236). In a more political 
understanding, populism means the movement of making something 
appealing to the people. The problem of this second meaning is that by the 
people one can refer to (a) all humans, (b) all citizens, (c) the nation and 
those belonging to it. There is a variety of meanings of the term “the people” 
as the populace that ranges from universalism on one end to nationalist 
particularism on the other end. Populism as political movement goes back to 
revolutionary movements in 19th century Russia (Labica 1987, 1026). But the 
term has also become associated with nationalist and right-wing extremist 
forces and ideology that try to appeal to prejudices, conceive of the people as 
an “undifferentiated unity” so that classes and their antagonisms are “denied 
and downplayed” (Labica 1987, 1028). Populism is therefore often associated 
with “demagogy, which has moved from ‘leading the people’ to ‘crude and 
simplifying agitation’” and with “rightist and fascist movements which exploit 
‘popular prejudices’” (Williams 1983, 238). In addition, populism is also used 
as a term for a particular style of politics that uses tabloidisation, 
scandalisation, entertainment, ridicule, simplification, one-dimensionality, and 
banalisation. Using a term such as “left-wing populism” is confusing because 
it can have many meanings: It can mean a political strategy that aims at 
ownership and control of society by all (self-management), a left strategy that 
uses popular culture, one that denies the existence of classes in a class 
society, one that uses tabloid politics, or one that resorts to traditionalist, 
nationalist or xenophobic rhetoric and prejudices.  
 
Whereas for Gramsci (2000) the “national-popular” as populism has to do with 
popular culture, organic intellectuals, the cultural dimension of class struggle, 
the popular university, and the formation of a collective socialist will, Hitler 
(1926) in Mein Kampf understands populism as the popularisation of the anti-
Semitic Nazi movement: “Later on the National Socialist Movement presented 
the Jewish problem in a new light. Taking the question beyond the restricted 
circles of the upper classes and small bourgeoisie we succeeded in 
transforming it into the driving motive of a great popular movement”. That both 
Gramsci and Hitler embraced the notions of the popular and of populism 
shows that these are not well-suited terms for a socialist strategy. Populism is 
not a clearly delineated, but rather a politically confusing term. 
 
Instead, the notion of authoritarianism is a more suitable concept for 
explaining the Trump phenomenon, as I have discovered in the research for 
my forthcoming book Digital Demagogue: Authoritarian Capitalism in the Age 
of Trump and Twitter (Fuchs 2018 for a preliminary prolegomena see Fuchs 
2017a & Fuchs 2017c). The critical theory of authoritarianism advanced by 
the Frankfurt School and related authors on fascism, Nazism, and the 
authoritarian personality has been very helpful in this regard and particularly 
works by Franz Leopold Neumann, Erich Fromm, Theodor W. Adorno, 
Herbert Marcuse, Leo Löwenthal, and Willhelm Reich. Seen as a totality, the 
body of works of these authors has the advantage that by combining political 
economy, ideology critique, and critical psychology it enables an integrative 
analysis of society. Furthermore, it combines the social sciences and 
humanities, social analysis and philosophy, empirical social research and 
sociological theory. These authors start from Karl Marx’s notions of alienation 
and Georg Lukács’ (1923/1972) concept of reification. They see exploitation, 
domination and ideological manipulation as types of instrumental reason, as 
forms of asymmetric power that instrumentalise labour power (exploitation), 
citizens (domination) and consciousness (ideology). 
  
A first important insight of the Frankfurt School authors is that political 
economy and ideology critique are not enough to fully understand right-wing 
authoritarianism. The combination of both can explain why right-wing 
authoritarianism emerges in particular contexts, but not why individuals and 
groups follow it. Wilhelm Reich (1972, 5) argued that the Left and Left 
analysis in the period form 1918 until 1933 only focused on “objective socio-
economic processes at a time of crisis” and failed “to take into account the 
character structure” and the “social effect of mysticism”. In order to produce 
proper understandings, critical theory and critical empirical research need to 
combine political economy and ideology critique with critical psychology. The 
success of far-right authoritarian populism is not just a matter of political-
economic crisis and nationalist ideology. A significant dimension is that it 
appeals to people’s everyday affects, emotions, desires, instincts, and drives.  
 
Franz L. Neumann is one of the rather forgotten thinkers of the Frankfurt 
School. His works managed to combine political economy, ideology critique, 
and critical psychology in the critical analysis of authoritarianism (see 
Neumann 2017/1957, Neumann 2009/1944; Fuchs 2018; Fuchs 2017c) 
Neumann (2017/1957) argues that destructive collective anxiety that 
generates large-scale support for far-right movements, groups, parties, 
institutions, and systems can emerge when six conditions coincide: a) the 
alienation of labour; b) destructive competition; c) social alienation; d) political 
alienation in respect to the political system; e) the institutionalisation of 
anxiety; and f) destructive psychological alienation and persecutory anxiety.  
 
These categories can be applied to an analysis of the links between current 
forms of neoliberal capitalism and the rise of right-wing authoritarianism. 
Neoliberal capitalism has resulted in the intensification of labour’s alienation, 
the destructiveness of competition, the great fear of social decline, political 
apathy, and a lack of trust in the political institutions of democracy and 
politicians. Neoliberalism is a politics of social anxiety (precarious labour and 
precarious life) that can backfire and turn into fascist politics of political 
anxiety. In this political void, nationalist and xenophobic far-right movements 
and their authoritarian leaders have not only stoked fears by constructing 
scapegoats, but have also promised alternatives in the form of nationalism, 
strong leaders, and authoritarian rule. They advance persecutory anxiety by 
creating and supporting the unleashing of aggressions in collective forms, and 
direct these at scapegoats. Contemporary societies can come to tipping 
points where quantity turns into new qualities that may take on the form of 
authoritarian capitalism and the undermining of democracy. Neoliberal 
capitalism has experienced its own negative dialectic of the enlightenment 
and has increasingly been sublated into authoritarian capitalism (Fuchs 2018,  
2017a). 
 
However, authoritarianism is multi-layered. It can operate at the levels of a) an 
individual’s psychology and behaviour; b) groups/movements/parties; c) 
institutions; or d) society. We must distinguish between right-wing 
authoritarian personalities, groups, institutions, and society. These levels are 
nested, meaning that an upper level always contains and requires all 
necessary preceding levels. Each level is a necessity, but not a sufficient 
condition for the next level. There is not deterministic or automatic 
development from one level to the next, only the possibility of emergence 
under specific conditions. 
 
 In my analysis of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of authoritarianism, I 
have identified four elements of authoritarianism that Frankfurt School 
scholars seem to agree on: a) authoritarian leadership; b) nationalism; c) the 
friend-enemy scheme; and d) patriarchy and militarism. Nationalism is the 
construction of fictive ethnicity that tries to unite people around the ideological 
belief in a commonality organised through elements such as blood, traditions, 
language, origin, and/or culture. Nationalism has a necessary outside, from 
which it distinguishes itself. The friend-enemy scheme constructs scapegoats, 
typically minorities, that are presented as society’s ills and as the causes of 
social problems. The inclusive form of the friend-enemy scheme argues for 
the inferiority of the enemy group in order to exploit it, and the exclusive form 
constructs the enemy as inferior for the purpose of deportation, imprisonment, 
or extermination. In authoritarianism, “[h]atred, resentment, dread, created by 
great upheavals, are concentrated on certain persons who are denounced as 
devilish conspirators”. In such situations, the “fear of social degradation […] 
creates for itself ‘a target for the discharge of the resentments arsing from 
damaged self-esteem’” (Neumann 2017/1957, 624). 
 
Right-wing authoritarianism is a type of political fetishism that idolises the 
nation as a mythical collective that is directed against perceived outsiders who 
must be contained, purged, or eliminated, in order to achieve greatness. Its 
ideological role is that it distracts attention from, and dissimulates, the 
complex structural causes of capitalism’s social problems that have to do with 
class structures and social domination. Nationalism tries to construct an 
ideological unity of capital and labour in the form of the national collective that 
is said to share a national interest that is under threat by foreigners and 
foreignness. The world is presented as a struggle between nations, a view 
that fetishises and naturalises the nation and disregards the realities of class 
conflicts and power inequalities. There is a difference between right-wing 
authoritarianism, right-wing extremism, and fascism. Whereas right-wing 
authoritarianism violates democracy, opposition is still possible and to a 
certain extent tolerated, whereas right-wing extremism propagates and 
practices direct violence against opponents, and fascism institutionalises it in 
the form of a system of terror. Authoritarian capitalism is a form of capitalist 
political economy, in which the principles of right-wing authoritarianism – 
authoritarian leadership, nationalism, the friend/enemy scheme, militarism, 
patriarchy, – are, to a specific degree, practiced by the state in order to 
organise capitalism and assert capitalist interests. In authoritarian capitalism, 
nationalism, political fetishism and scapegoating are politically practiced as 
ideology put into legal form in order to distract attention from class 
contradictions.  
 
Authoritarianism involves the belief in, and the practice of, hierarchic social 
structures dominated by the leadership principle. Leadership is applied as a 
principle of totality that has no respect for individuality in the organisation of 
the political system, the capitalist economy, the army, the family, and the 
cultural organisation. Erich Fromm pioneered the study of the authoritarian 
personality. He describes the right-wing authoritarian leader and his followers 
as sadomasochistic personalities characterised by the simultaneous “striving 
for submission and domination” (Fromm 1942/2001, 122). A sadomasochistic 
individual “admires authority and tends to submit to it, but at the same time 
[…] wants to be an authority himself and have others submit to him” (141). 
Under the accumulated experience of particular conditions, the psychological 
striving for freedom and solidarity is suspended by negative dialectics of 
superiority/inferiority, love/hate, construction/destruction, 
submission/aggression. One psychological dimension of authoritarianism is 
that it is a form of collective narcissism The vision of the strong leader 
produces the psychological “enlargement of the subject: by making the leader 
his ideal he loves himself, as it were, but gets rid of the stains of frustration 
and discontent which mar his picture of his own empirical self” (Adorno 1951, 
140). “The narcissistic gain provided by fascist propaganda is obvious” 
(Adorno 1951, 145). An authoritarian leader presents himself as superman 
and ordinary, as a “great little man” (Adorno 1951, 142). The image of the 
superman allows projection and submission – the sado-masochistic desire to 
be a superman and to be dominated by a superman.  
 
Militarist patriarchy combines the gender division of social life with the 
fetishisation of the male soldier as the ideal human being. Competition, 
egoism, violence, and, in the final instance, physical destruction, war, and 
imperialism, are seen as natural features of the human being and as 
appropriate solutions for social conflict. According to Klaus Theweleith (1987, 
272),“Under patriarchy, the productive force of women has been effectively 
excluded from participating in male public and social productions”. In 
patriarchy, leaders are typically male. The friend/enemy-scheme in the final 
instance leads to wars. Patriarchy entails militarism; the glorification of the 
male soldier, surveillance, the police; imperialism, and warfare. The figures of 
the soldier and the policeman are also bound up with nationalist ideology. The 
soldier and the policeman are in nationalist ideology seen as the defenders of 
the nation against foreigners and enemies. Authoritarians “destroy others to 
create themselves; they destroy things in the alien object-world and 
metamorphose into killing-machines and their components: a ‘baptism of fire.’ 
Wreaking revenge is their way of becoming one with themselves” (Theweleit 
1989, 382). Militarist ideology and practice aims at annihilating the perceived 
enemies. 
 
Speaking of right-wing authoritarianism implies that there is also left-wing 
authoritarianism. Stalinism was the best example of left-wing authoritarianism. 
It employed a socialist rhetoric and language, but used the leadership 
principle, nationalism, militarism, patriarchy, and a repressive state apparatus 
for the organisation and defence of a state-capitalist regime (James 1986). 
Only Stalinism’s rhetoric was socialist. The Stalinist bureaucracy acted as a 
collective capitalist controlling the economy and exploiting waged and 
unwaged labour. In addition, the Stalinist economy was ideologically 
legitimated by a protestant ethic of toil, the idealisation of manual labour and 
abstinence (Marcuse 1958). Thus, the opposite of Stalinism is not “left 
populism”, but democratic socialism. 
 
Frankfurt School-authors’ analysis of right-wing authoritarianism remains 
crucial today for understanding phenomena such as Donald Trump and their 
use of digital media. 
 
3. Trump, Social Media and Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
 
There is an academic dispute about the causes of support for right-wing 
authoritarianism. The culturalist hypothesis assumes that such support is the 
result of a cultural and generational gap between the older and younger 
generations and the rise of post-material values (Inglehart and Norris 2016). 
The socio-economic hypothesis ascertains that the support of right-wing 
authoritarianism has to do with socio-economic inequalities, class structures, 
de-classification, and fears of social degradation (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; 
Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 2002; Oesch 2008, Rooduijn 2016; Werts, 
Scheepers and Lubbers).  
 
Taken together, there is ample evidence of certain tendencies, namely that 
voters of far-right parties live in rural areas, are older, are active or 
unemployed blue-collar workers, and live in areas that have become de-
industrialised. Also unemployed, routine service workers and small business 
owners show a certain tendency to vote for far-right parties. Fears and 
realities of social degradation and declassification generated by neoliberalism, 
post-industrialisation, transnational capitalism, and computerised automation 
play an important role. The generational gap that was amply observed in the 
Brexit referendum is not a different, but related phenomenon: The rise of the 
knowledge-based society has brought about higher levels of occupation for 
the younger generation, which comes along with different social experiences, 
realities, and moral values than in the parent generation. The younger 
generation faces new forms of self-determination combined with precarity that 
together with its educational status makes them overall more likely to support 
left-wing over right-wing forces. Especially blue-collar workers experiencing 
the key factors that Neumann (2017/1957) described (see the previous 
section), including economic, social and political alienation, are prone to right-
wing demagoguery.  
 
The question of who supports right-wing authoritarianism is not new. Classical 
critical theories have often made the mistake to characterise right-wing 
authoritarianism and fascism as petty bourgeoisie movements. In contrast, 
more recent empirical research has shown that for example the Nazis had 
significant support of blue-collar workers both in respect to its membership 
and voters (Falter 1991, 2016; Fischer 1996). Nationalist ideology enables far-
right parties to act as popular parties that promise something for every group 
in the name of the nation. 
 
Authoritarian populism appeals to the emotions partly via public 
communications, including entertainment formats and social media. 
Therefore, it is not a coincidence that Donald Trump’s two favourite media are 
reality TV and Twitter. Authoritarian politicians are convinced that one cannot 
“get at the masses with arguments, proofs, and knowledge, but only with 
feelings and beliefs” (Reich 1972, 83). Today, this circumstance is most often 
referred to as post-truth politics.  
 
It is not an accident that Trump’s preferred media are reality-TV and Twitter. 
Trump’s capital accumulation is not simply real estate and casinos, but Trump 
the brand. Trump is a narcissistic self-branding machine that generates rent 
and profits for products that hold the Trump label. Trump is “the 
personification of the merger of humans and corporations – a one-man 
megabrand, whose wife and children are spin-off brands” (Klein 2017, 10). 
The Apprentice embodies the ingredients of social-Darwinist survival of the 
fittest, competition, militarism, patriarchy, and hyper-individualism. Twitter is 
based on a culture of high speed, superficiality and brevity. It supports 
simplistic, brief 140-character, propaganda messages transmitted at high 
speed that allow Trump to live out narcissism and feelings of leadership. In 
turn, the platform allows his supporters to admire their leader and express 
their hatred for the scapegoats. Trumpism is a political model that combines 
Trump’s self-branding with the logic of The Apprentice and Twitter (Fuchs 
2018,  2017a).  
 
Among the reasons of the success of the authoritarian Right is that the 
simplicity and aggressiveness of its ideology appeals to those who feel 
politically left alone, disenfranchised, disappointed, and anxious. Media-savvy 
right-wing leaders “instrumentalize such disenchantment in text, image and 
talk, via many discursive and material practices” (Wodak 2015, 182). Social 
media is, just like the beer tent, the pub, and the public assembly, a space in 
which right-wing authoritarianism is communicated. Right-wing 
authoritarianisation is based on the Haiderisation and the Berluconisation of 
politics (Wodak 2013) – two forms of far-right authoritarian politics using 
entertainment and media publicity that were pioneered by Jörg Haider in 
Austria and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy.  
 
Right-wing authoritarian communication is a semiotic strategy that publicly 
communicates right-wing authoritarianism’s four elements. Based on critical 
theory, we can study how right wing authoritarianism is communicated in 
public, such as on social media. For the book Authoritarian Capitalism in the 
Age of Donald Trump and Twitter, I have used Frankfurt School theory as 
foundation for the analysis of Trumpism and Trump’s communication strategy. 
For the empirical analysis, I collected all postings from Trump’s Twitter-
account @RealDonaldTrump for the time period between the start of the 
Republication National Convention (July 18, 2016) and Trump’s inauguration 
(January 21, 2017). I used TAGS (Twitter Archiving Google Sheet), which is a 
plug-in to Google Docs. The data collection resulted in a total of 1,815 tweets 
that were the foundation for a Critical Discourse Analysis that used the 
Frankfurt School’s critical theory of authoritarianism as its foundation. CDA 
combines text-immanent critique, socio-diagnostic critique, and prospective 
critique (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 31-35). It critically theorises and analyses 
texts in their contexts and aims at advancing prospects for progressive 
changes of society. Critical social media discourse analysis can in contrast 
use “small data” analysis that provides a deep critical analysis of meanings.  
 
Consider the following two examples: 
 
 
Figure 1: Tweet by Donald Trump, example 1 
 
 
Figure 2: Tweet by Donald Trump, example 2 
 
In a nationalist manner, Trump communicates the need to “make America 
great again”. National greatness is said to have come under threat by illegal 
immigrants, Africans, transfer of taxes to foreigners, and development aid. 
Americanness and the American interest are identified with the American 
working class, while un-Americanness is identified with immigrants and the 
developing world. 
 
There are two semiotic chains, one of negative associations (amnesty, 
illegals, waste, Africa) and one of positive associations (protect, invest, 
concern, workers, America, greatness) that are combined with each other. 
The implication suggested is that immigrants and the developing world 
threaten the American worker and therefore the American interest. Political 
action by, and support of, Trump would therefore be needed in order to “make 
America great again”. What is missing in the picture is U.S. capitalism that in 
reality not only exploits U.S. workers, but also migrant workers and workers in 
developing countries.  
 
4. Conclusion: Towards Chaplin 2.0, Brecht 2.0, Verfremdung 2.0, 
Critical Data Visualisation, Slow Media, and Critical Public Sociology  
 
One of the problems of the Left is that it has lost its appeal to blue-collar 
workers who fear or experience social degradation, and who are, despite 
automation, computerisation and de-industrialisation, large enough in 
numbers to tip election results towards the right and the far-right. This is 
especially the case when voter turnouts are low, the Left is disorganised, 
factionalised and weak, and when social democracy imitates neoliberalism 
and entrepreneurialism in an attempt to appeal to the new “middle class”.  
 
Corporate media monopolies and the logic of the acceleration, 
spectacularisation, and tabloidisation of the media are part of the reason why 
we see a rise in right-wing authoritarianism. The Left therefore needs to 
struggle for media reforms that advance slow media, non-commercial media, 
public interest media, a public-service Internet, the digital and communicative 
commons, and platform co-operatives (Fuchs 2018, 2017b). 
 
Part of the problem of the Left is that it has more problems in appealing to the 
psyche, emotions, affects, and desires of those who feel politically anxious 
and disenfranchised than the Right does. It would be wrong to imitate the 
communication strategies and elements of right-wing authoritarianism. But the 
Left can also not leave political psychology entirely to the Right. Those who 
feel politically anxious and disenfranchised need to express their desires for 
love and hate. The key question is then how the Left can manage to turn a 
disenfranchised group’s love for the authoritarian leader and nationalism into 
a love for participatory democracy and socialism, and its hatred of immigrants 
and foreigners into the hatred of capitalism and inequality. Part of the problem 
is that prejudices can often not be countered by rational arguments and citing 
statistical data, because they operate at the psychological level of hopes and 
fears that are the psychological material of post-truth politics. The solution 
then is not that the Left gives up the use of well thought-out arguments and 
debates. On the contrary, the point is to understand the complexity of the 
world and come up with proper responses that are supported by visual and 
argumentative strategies that bring the problem to the point. 
 
Critical visualisations of data, studies, and statistics can form one important 
element of how to popularise progressive thought so that it challenges right-
wing authoritarianism’s prejudices, nationalism, scapegoating, and leadership 
ideology. An interesting way of responding to right-wing authoritarianism’s 
irrationality is by political humour, satire, and parody. Horkheimer and Adorno 
(2002, 60) wrote about the “ambiguity of laughter”: “If laughter up to now has 
been a sign of violence, an outbreak of blind, obdurate nature, it nevertheless 
contains the opposite element, in that through laughter blind nature becomes 
aware of itself as such and thus abjures its destructive violence”. Humour is 
part of oppression itself, but may also be turned into challenging oppression. 
Left critique can be simultaneously enlightening, humorous, and serious. 
There is much to learn in this respect from Charlie Chaplin and Bertolt Brecht. 
The Left 2.0 requires Charlie Chaplin 2.0 and Brecht 2.0 for the age of social 
media and big data. The right-wing authoritarian spectacle staged via social 
media and reality TV needs to be challenged by the Brechtian epic and 
dialectical theatre 2.0, and the Boalian theatre of the oppressed 2.0.  
 
Chaplin described the communicative approach of his movie The Great 
Dictator (1940): “Pessimists say I may fail – that dictators aren't funny any 
more, that the evil is too serious. That is wrong. If there is one thing I know it 
is that power can always be made ridiculous. The bigger that fellow gets the 
harder my laughter will hit him” (Van Gelder 1940).  
 
Brecht speaks of Verfremdung as opposed to Entfremdung (estrangement, 
alienation) as principle of the dialectical theatre. “Verfremdung estranges an 
incident or character simply by taking from the incident or character what is 
self-evident, familiar, obvious in order to produce wonder and curiosity. […] 
The V-effect consists in turning the object of which it is to be made aware, to 
which one’s attention is to be drawn, from something ordinary, familiar, 
immediately accessible, into something peculiar, striking and unexpected” 
(Brecht 2015, 143, 192). Verfremdung is a negation of the negation that 
creates feelings, emotions and affects of curiosity, surprise, and wonder. 
Verfremdung is the alienation of alienation and the estrangement of 
estrangement. By Verfremdung 2.0 we mean equivalents of the Brechtian 
dialectical principle in the digital age. 
 
Consider the following two examples. Figure 3 is a humorous comment on 
Trump’s firing of FBI Director James Comey, figure 4 suggests that Trump 
may just like Richard Nixon face impeachment. Meme and social media 
culture is in such cases turned into a left-wing strategy. For characterising 
such strategies, we do not need the term left populism, but can rather speak 
of left cultural politics or critical cultural politics. The term left populism in 
contrast risks association with a politics that is nationalist or xenophobic, does 
everything necessary and does not shy away from any tactic in order to 
appeal to as many people as possible.  
 
 




Figure 4: Tweet by @RealDonalDrumpf 
 
However, it is also the task of the intellectual in the difficult times we live in to 
be a critical, public intellectual who practices a critical, public social science. 
Franz L. Neumann, who as a Jewish socialist intellectual had to flee from 
Nazi-Germany to Britain and the USA, and who perfectly understood right-
wing authoritarianism like only few others did, has brought this task of a 
critical public sociology to the point in his essay Anxiety and Politics 
(Neumann 2017/1957, 629):  
 
“Hence there remains for us as citizens of the university and of the state 
the dual offensive on anxiety and for liberty: that of education and that of 
politics. Politics, again, should be a dual thing for us: the penetration of 
the subject matter of our academic discipline with the problems of 
politics […] and the taking of positions on political questions. If we are 
serious about the humanization of politics; if we wish to prevent a 
demagogue from using anxiety and apathy, then we – as teachers and 
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